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Bosnia-Herzegovina: Domestic Agency and the Inadequacy of the Liberal Peace 
 
Roberto Belloni, Stefanie Kappler and Jasmin Ramovic 
 
This chapter discusses the controversial impact of the liberal peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(hereafter Bosnia). Despite a massive international commitment, or perhaps because of it, 
Bosnia since the end of the war in 1995 has evolved towards a situation characterized by 
presence of internationally supported domestic institutions with limited local legitimacy. 
Rather than endorsing the various tenets of the liberal peace, Bosnians have increasingly 
protested against what many of them consider a failed statebuilding effort unable to meet 
their economic, political, social and cultural needs. This chapter traces this failure in three 
steps: it highlights the emergence of “spaces of agency” among civil society organizations 
and cultural groups and institutions which has long been overlooked, it explains how 
dissatisfaction has spread to involve economic and social issues and, finally, how 
international liberal agents have turned into the primary defenders of a political and 
economic system which preserves only a facade of liberalism.  
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Introduction 
It has long been argued that Bosnians are apathetic, apolitical and not capable of or willing 
to bring about political change. The international community has often accused Bosnians 
of being inert1 emphasising how citizens could positively impact upon the local political 
process through the elections, but have often failed to do so. However, as this chapter 
shows, often-overlooked processes of political mobilisation have taken place in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, because of, or perhaps in spite of, a system based on international tutelage. 
Cultural and social movements of resistance have existed in the country for some time, but 
were barely channelled into official political processes. Such movements, as we argue, 
have laid the foundations for a wave of high-profile protests in many Bosnian towns in 
February 2014. These protests testify to Bosnian citizens’ attempt to reclaim their agency 
and suggest alternatives of how their economic, political and social needs can be met. 
Both popular protests and bottom-up proposals have faced mixed responses on the part of 
the international community. In fact, the protest movements have forced international 
actors to rethink the role of Bosnian citizens in the peace- and state-building jigsaw, while 
at the same time clinging firmly to established top-down mechanisms of intervention. It is 
through the interaction between such competing processes that we can see the potential 
emergence of a post-liberal peace, which, however, is still carrying the burden of two 
decades of intervention.  
 This chapter takes an insider-outsider perspective in that one of the authors has 
been involved in the protest movement himself. These insider-experiences are 
complemented through interviews as well as a long-standing engagement with 
international peacebuilding on the part of all authors. We have seen the recent protests as 
a fundamental change to previous patterns of political apathy as well as the ways in which 
the ‘everyday’ is politicised. 2  At the same time, we acknowledge the continuities of 
international intervention, linked to the power of the state. We see these interactions as 
                                                        
1
Jukic, Elvira (2012), “Report Highlights Young Bosnians' Political Apathy”, Balkan Insight, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/young-bosnians-mistrust-politics-but-lack-initiative (accessed 02 May 
2014).  
2
Cf. Ley, David. “Transnationalspaces and everydaylives”. Transactions of the Institute of 
BritishGeographers  29, no.2 (2004): 151–164. 
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particularly relevant in our analysis of agency that responds to the inadequacy of the 
‘Liberal Peace’.3 
 
 
Political agency in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
With respect to local agency, the assessment of Bosnians as “apathetic” does not take into 
account the recent political history of the country, the disempowering role of the 
international community, as well as the presence of significant agencies and activities 
concentrated outside of the public sphere. 
To begin with, the first experience of mass-scale protests played an important role 
in depressing public political participation for years to come. It took place shortly after the 
country’s authoritarian regime was replaced by a democratic one, and at a time when 
Yugoslavia started to crumble. A series of demonstrations for peace were held in this 
period gatheringan unprecedented number of people.4 The protests culminated on 5 April 
1992, when approximately 100,000 people assembledin Sarajevo in front of the BiH 
Parliament demanding peace. Sniper shots were fired at protesters, introducing the siege 
of the city and the cataclysm, which was to engulf the entire country for three and a half 
years. This traumatic experience has left a mark of deep frustration in the memory of 
Bosnian people by sending a message that the public is powerless when faced with the 
agenda of political elites.5  Both the conflict which ensued and the post-conflict years 
dominated by nationalist politics have served to engrain this message in the memory of all 
citizens, and to restrict them to a voting body pray to manipulation by political elites. The 
fact that most jobs in the bloated civil service depend on political connections and 
patronage contributes significantly to passivity.  
 Second, strong interventionism by the international community until 2006 left only 
minimal space for grassroots initiatives and consultations with local actors, and thus 
obstructed citizens’ activism. This heavy-handed approach achieved some short-term 
positive results and led key international actors to perceive BiH as a successful liberal 
                                                        
3
Mac Ginty R (2011), International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace. London: 
Palgrave.   
4
In 1991 the protests for peace have culminated in ‘YUTEL zamir – YUTEL for peace’, a concert organized 
by the pan-Yugoslav TV station YUTEL. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sx2Hl0xeliI , Accessed on 4 
September, 2014.  
5
LjubicaSpaskokska, “Landscapes of Resistence, Hope, and Loss: Yugoslav Supra-Nationalism and Anti-
Nationalism,” in BojanBilić&Vesan Jankovic, eds., Resisting the Evil: (Post-) Yugoslav Anti-War Contnetion, 
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012, p. 58. For a gooddiscussion of anti-war activism in the formerYugslavia and 
itslegacy, seeBojanBilić, WeWereGasping for Air, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012.  
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peacebuilding project.6 The resulting reduced role of the international community after 
2006 allowed the defects of the liberal peacebuilding to surface. The stalemate which has 
characterised BiH ever since confirms the limitations of international intervention, which 
has been almost exclusively focused on issues relevant for the interveners themselves, 
such as economic and political liberalization, with local voices reduced to artificially-
created non-governmental organisations (NGOs).7 
Third, the assessment of the Bosnian population as “apathetic” is based on the 
assumption that political mobilisation happens in public spheres and visibly increases its 
energy over time. In the social movement literature, a number of reasons have been 
brought forward of why people protest, such as grievances, efficacy, identification, 
emotions and social embeddedness. However, what the bulk of social movement theory 
has long been doing is to analyse the phenomenon from a rational choice perspective8 as 
well as focusing on the clearly visible manifestations of grievances and associated protest 
movements.The more hiddenspheres of social mobilisation have not been sufficiently 
investigated in their ability to code and disguise agency in contexts where open protest 
may seem inappropriate or even dangerous. This is based on the insight that bigger social 
movements often emerge from hidden networks.9 Particularly in a context such as in BiH, 
with a history of socialism and a risk of censorship, the public sphere has not always been 
the primary field of resistance. Some even ascribe this to the tendency of the Ottoman 
Empire to avoid building public spaces, at least outside mosques,10 which can be said to 
disincentivise open gatherings and publicly visible protest. Against this background, the 
vocalisation of grievances on the part of the population has traditionally not focused on 
public protest, but has taken on a coded form in alternative circles. A number of informal or 
alternative spaces and venues have been in existence for some time. These spaces had 
served as microcosms of protestwherepolitical discourses countering the elites had 
emerged. Above all, cultural spaces and youth centres are particularly noteworthy as 
alternative arenas, and are discussed below. 
 
                                                        
6
TarikLazović, 'Christian Schwarz-Schillingotkriva: BiH bi se raspala da janisam 2008. 
godinespriječiozatvaranje OHR-a', Dnevniavaz, 13 March, 2011. 
7
Roberto Belloni, “Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Journal of PeaceResearch, 
vol.38, no.2, 2001, pp.163-180. 
8
Melissa Leach and Ian Scoones (2007), “Mobilising Citizens: Social Movements and the Politics of 
Knowledge”, IDS WORKING PAPER 276, p. 11; available at http://w.drc-
citizenship.org/system/assets/1052734544/original/1052734544-leach_etal.2007-mobilising.pdf (accessed 
26 June 2014).  
9
Bettina Koehler and Markus Wissen (2003), “Glocalizing Protest: Urban Conflicts and Global Social 
Movements”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research Volume 27(4), p. 947.  
10
Confidential source, personal interview, Sarajevo, 06/09/13. 
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1. Making space for change: The hidden histories of protest 
To begin with, cultural spaces have a particular standing in BiH. This has to be seen in the 
context of the former Yugoslavia, in which culture was thriving. Even during the war and 
the siege of Sarajevo, the city enjoyed a vibrant cultural life, staging performances, 
exhibitions and other arts projects.11Theatres were full during the war as they also served 
as escape shelters from the atrocities happening in the city.12 Such dynamics have sown 
the seeds for cultural spaces acting as arenas where political discourses could be 
exchanged. This went hand in hand with the need of citizens to establish some kind of 
normality in their everyday lives in the chaos and abnormality of a wartime situation.13 
 This effort to establish, maintain and develop some sort of “free zones” detached 
from but at the same time in constant relation with the official public sphere dominated by 
nationalist categories continued in the post-war period. For instance, the Duplex Gallery in 
Sarajevo moved in 2013, but was before in a location that was hard to find. This was a 
deliberate decision of the owner, not least as he viewed the gallery as a ‘space of 
resistance’ to challenge the ‘system’, that is, the system in which internationals engage 
with and fund Bosnian actors.14 At the same time, although this is an arts gallery in the first 
place, it is quite common to find a variety of people around the gallery discussing politics, 
including issues of social justice and the future of BiH. Such debates are deliberately kept 
away from the formal political sphere, which is often perceived as corrupt and thus not 
worthy of serious debate. Instead, discussions in the backyards of public areas, such as 
the one in which the Duplex Gallery was located, have seemed to absorb the energy, 
which has long appeared to be missing in public debates. In that sense, although it may be 
counterintuitive to perceive an art gallery as a space of concrete politics, these alternative 
spaces have been able to re-politicise the everyday challenges as they arise in a 
peacebuilding context.  
 Along similar lines, theatres have become increasingly socially active. Again, this is 
not least due to the crucial role that drama played during the siege of Sarajevo, including, 
for instance, the staging of “Waiting for Godot”, linked with the visit of Susan Sontag in 
1993. Interestingly enough, the same play was staged again in 2009 under the auspices of 
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C. Zelizer (2003) ‘The role of artistic processes in peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, Peace and 
Conflict Studies, 10(2), p. 66. 
12
Aida Pilav, PozoristeMladih Sarajevo, personal interview, Sarajevo, 31/03/10. See also AsjaMandić, “The 
Formation of a Culture of Critical Resistance in Sarajevo: Exhibitions In/On Ruins,” Third Text, 25 (6), 2011, 
pp. 725-735. 
13
Macek, Ivana (2009), Sarajevo Under Siege. Anthropology in Wartime, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania.  
14
Interview with owner, Sarajevo, 23/04/10. 
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the East-West Theatre.15 One may interpret this as an attempt to demonstrate that, as 
much as people had been waiting for the war to end in 1993, in 2009 many were waiting 
for this particular kind of peace to end as well. Similarly, the Sarajevski Ratni 
Teatar(Sarajevo War Theatre) hosts a number of politically engaged performances and 
exhibitions, such as the 2013 production “Bio je lijep i sunčan dan”, a collection of 
Sarajevans’ stories about the siege. Such plays encourage people to reflect on their past 
and the ways in which it relates to the present. Interestingly, the theatre also hosts the 
‘Open University’, a platform for public debate in the absence of public space in the 
country,16 where some of the most burning political issues have been discussed. While it 
may go too far to suggest that theatres thus have become platforms of politics, it can be 
argued that they encourage critical reflection, which may or may not translate into political 
action.  
 In addition to cultural spaces, youth centres are another example in which political 
mobilisation has taken place beyond the reach of formal politics. On the one hand, the 
audiences of youth centres are limited not only in terms of age, but also in terms of 
attracting a particular type of young people who are said to be more ‘alternative’. As a 
result it has been difficult for the centres to increase their outreach into wider 
communities.17 On the other hand, as the example of the OKC Abrašević in Mostar shows, 
the goal is not necessarily to represent or reach out into society as a whole but, according 
to one of the centre coordinators, to “create a micro-society.”18 In that respect, a form of 
political mobilisation takes places, which is fundamentally different from mainstream 
politics in its approach and direction. Indeed, the president of the youth council in 
Srebrenica has emphasised that she would not want to be a politician as with the youth 
centre she has a different way of bringing about change. In this regard, the centre is a 
space of resistance in which alternatives can be politically developed and in which people 
“can think and fight.”19 This is similar to the OKC Abrašević, which is deliberately placed 
on the front lines to avoid being categorised as part of one or the other community. 
Unsurprisingly, one of the Mostar plenums, which followed from the numerous acts of 
resistance in Bosnian towns in February 2014 (further discussed below),took place in the 
                                                        
15
Carter, Imogen (2009), “Desperately thanking Susan”, The Observer, 5 
April.http://www.theguardian.com/stage/2009/apr/05/susan-sontag-godot-sarajevo-bosnia (accessed 
26/09/14). 
16
Malagic, Medina (2013), “Start of Open University Sarajevo in Beginning of December”, Independent 
Balkan News Agency. http://www.balkaneu.com/start-open-university-sarajevo-beginning-december/ 
(accessed 26/09/14).  
17
GoranBubalo, personal interview, Sarajevo, 02/09/13. 
18
Personal interview, Mostar, 05/09/13. 
19
Milena Nikolic, personal interview, Srebrenica, 02/04/10 
 7 
OKC Abrasevic, while the first Sarajevo plenum was held on the premises of the student 
radio at the university. Without identifying any causal link, it is nonetheless intriguing to ask 
to what extent these seemingly non-political spaces have acted as drivers of political 
mobilisation in 2014.  
 Hence, while formal politics have long been based on the separation and division of 
communities along ethnic lines, these centres have acted as microcosms of an almost 
pan-Yugoslav nostalgia.20 The centres have brought together and mobilised young people 
beyond the nationalist discourses to create the basic stepping-stones for cooperation 
along common interests, whether they be debate, cinema, music, or other activities. For 
instance, this is evident in the youth centre “Alter Art” in Travnik, where young people have 
come together since 1995, as musicians in the first place. Although the centre does not 
necessarily see itself as a space of resistance, it nevertheless serves as a creative place 
in which ‘expression without restrictions’ is possible. 21  This happens less specifically 
through political action, but represents an attempt to restore the politically lost freedom 
through creative activities around the needs of the surrounding community. It is exactly this 
notion of freethinking and expression without restrictions that has been missing in the 
political sphere, which has been seen as constrained and lacking trust on the part of the 
population.22 Against this background, the ambition of cultural centres to re-politicise social 
discourses,23 or of youth centres to serve as microcosms of cooperation around particular 
projects, represent important mobilisation spaces for political action. It was only a matter of 
time before this kind of hidden political activity would erupt in the public sphere. 
 
Public protests in BiH 
The protests that took place in Sarajevo in early 2008 have introduced a new dynamic, 
which showed that Bosnians are starting to resist irrationalities imposed by the Dayton 
Peace Agreement (DPA)24not only in cultural spaces but also in the public sphere. A 
number of small-scale workers' protests were held in early-mid 2000s. Even though some 
of them were even marked with hunger strikes, they received only minimum attention in 
the media and were to a large extent ignored by political elites. Only gradually workers' 
                                                        
20
Katie Hampton, OKC Abrašević, personal interview, Mostar, 18/03/10. 
21
DarkoSaracevic, personal interview, Travnik, 02/03/11. 
22
Chandler, David (2006), “Building trust in public institutions? Good governance and anti-corruption in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina”, Ethnopolitics, Vol.5 (1), pp. 85-99. 
23
Cf. Kappler, Stefanie, “Everyday legitimacy in post-conflict spaces: The creation of social legitimacy in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s cultural arenas”, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 7(1), 11-28, 2013. 
24
See, for example, SumantraBose, Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalistpartition and 
internationalintervention,London: Hurst& Co., 2002; Roberto Belloni, State Building and International 
Intervention in Bosnia, New York: Routledge, 2007. 
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frustrations merged with frustrations of the pensioners and the youth – who never even 
had a chance to find work, as the number of opportunities for employment have been very 
low.25 
 These cumulating frustrations came to the fore at the beginning of 2008. In 
February, Sarajevo experienced a wave of juvenile crimes, which culminated in the murder 
of 17-year old Denis Mrnjavac. This triggered a wave of protests, in which several 
thousands of Sarajevans took part. Initially the protesters demandedthe improvement of 
security for citizens of the city, but the focus quickly shifted on the incompetence of ruling 
elites and their unwillingness to address issues, which were of importance for the majority 
of the population. The public was not only disappointed because of the aggravated 
security situation in the city, but also because of the general socio-economic situation, 
marked by high unemployment and a lack of prospect for youth – elements that to a 
significant extent underpinned the wave of juvenile crimes.26Protesters demanded the 
resignation of the Prime minister of the Sarajevo Canton Government and of the Mayor of 
Sarajevo both of whom denied responsibility, dismissed demands for their resignation and 
tried to discredit the protesters. In one instance, the prime minister even described the 
protesters as a ‘mob’.27 
 Protest walks went on for weeks along the main streets of Sarajevo, passing by the 
BiH Presidency, Canton Government, Federation Court and Prosecutor's Office, and 
Mayor's Office. All protests were marked with chanting of derogatory terms addressed at 
officials in these institutions. Although the protests were essentially non-violent, they once 
escalated and led to the throwing of rocks towards the building of the Canton Sarajevo 
Government. Gradually, however, the initial enthusiasm started to diminish, and three 
months later the protests completely ceased. It seemed that little changed, apart from the 
introduction of some short-sighted measures by the Canton Government and its pledges to 
build more correctional facilities for juveniles. However, in October 2008 the prime minister 
resigned, citing the poor performance of his political party in the municipal elections. 
Although never officially admitted, his resignation arrived also because of his mishandling 
of the protests, and the related decreased popularity of his party. Therefore, even though 
                                                        
25
SETimes.com, 'Nezaposlenost omladine postaje ozbiljan problem u jugoistočnoj Evropi', 17 July, 2007, 
Available at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/bs/features/setimes/features/2007/07/17/feature-
03, Accessed on 18 August, 2014. 
26
Radio Free Europe, 'Mladi i nasilje: Problem društva, škole i porodice', 26 October, 2014, 
http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/mladi-i-nasilje-problem-drustva-skole-i-porodice/26657410.html 
Accessed on 29 October, 2014.  
27
Radio Free Europe, Političari zakovani za fotelje, 'ostavka' im nije u rječniku, 29 October, 
2013,http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/politicari-zakovani-za-fotelje-ostavka-im-nije-u-
rijecniku/25151917.html, Accessed on 20 August, 2014. 
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the protests seemed initially unsuccessful, they actually contributed to a significant change 
in government. The decrease of the popularity of the prime minister continued into the 
2010 general elections when his party almost completely dissolved.28 
 As a whole, the main importance of these protests wasits long-term nature. First of 
all, they provided a lesson to citizens and political elites by showing that the opinion of the 
public mattered and could even contribute to the resignation of the prime minister. Local 
actors rediscovered the agency at their disposal, the agency that was suffocated by a 
Byzantine political system and a sense of powerlessness. Protests also set a precedent, 
whichwould be followed by citizens in other parts of the country, as following sections will 
show. Additionally, the non-ethnic cause behind these protests showed that many citizens 
share the same concerns, and that they identify predatory elites and the misfit policies of 
the international community asthe main immediate causes of their misfortune, rather than 
people from a different ethnic group.  
 The non-ethnic nature of the citizens’ movement is perhaps best reflected in the 
protests that took place in Banja Luka (Republika Srpska) in 2012 for the preservation of 
the ‘Pica’ park. This park was set to be destroyed because one local businessman, with 
strong links to local political leaders, 29  planned to build a residential and business 
complex. The protests soon outgrew their initial cause. The declaration of the informal 
citizen group ‘Park je naš' (The park is ours) highlights injustices attributed to political 
elites, and is worth quoting at some length:  
 
“We come at a time when the ruling oligarchy confirms that we, ordinary people, 
are the biggest losers of the war and the transition period. Under the disguise of 
ethnic interest, this oligarchy puts profit above people, personal interest above 
justice […] this civil protest, as a manner of political battle, is not only a battle for 
the Park. It is here that the common sense, dignity and a right to a better life are 
being defended [...] the system makes us unequal on the basis of our 
nationality, race, and most of all on the basis of the class and economics. We 
                                                        
28
Nezavisne novine, 'Najviše mandata SNSD, SDP i SDA', 4 October, 2010, 
http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Najvise-mandata-za-SNSD-SDP-i-SDA-69614.html Accessed on 1 
September, 2014.  
29
See BHT1, Crta – Političkimagazin, May 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UTPa78Mp3tc 
Accessed on 26 August, 2014.  
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have become mute, blind, without any rights, scared poor people. Enough of 
this!”30 
 
From May to September 2012 hundreds of Banja Luka citizens participated in protest 
walks. The walks were held along the main street, passing by administrative buildings of 
entity and city-level institutions. One of the protesters’ routines was to stop in front of them 
and shout ‘lopovi’ (thieves). While the park was eventually destroyed and part of the new 
building constructed, in June 2014 the businessman behind the project was sentenced to 
imprisonment – in a sense validating the protesters’ claim that the construction was 
marred by injustice.31 
 Another important protest took place in June 2013. It focused on personal 
identification numbers and became known as ‘baby revolution’ or ‘baby-lution’.32 In Bosnia, 
new-borns are required to have an identification number in order to obtain documents 
such as birth certificates, medical cards and passports. The Parliamentary Assembly failed 
to adopt provisions regulating this matter and thus brought issuance of ID numbers to a 
halt for a few months. Belmina Ibrišević was one of the children born in that period, who 
needed a passport to travel outside of BiH to get a medical treatment that her life 
depended on.33 Political elites ignored calls of her family and of the media to solve the 
problem and instead saw the issue of identity numbers as a vital national interest, which 
had to be defended by all means. Meanwhile another child, Berina Hamidović,became the 
first victim of the ID numbers row. She died on 13 June, just before she turned three 
months. 34 Mothers decided to act. On 5 June 2013 they showed up in front of the 
Parliament with their prams and babies and together with 3,000 other citizens formed a 
chain around the building, with the intention of preventing parliamentarians from leaving it 
until the new law on ID numbers was adopted. This action brought immense public support 
for the protesters – demonstrating the presence in the country of a non-ethnic solidarity 
unseen at a similar scale after the conflict. Even though politicians again tried to defend 
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Buka, ‘Deklaracijainicijative “Park je naš“', 7 September, 2012, 
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their actions with reference to national/ethnic causes, they eventually adopted a new 
version of the Law, which enabled the issuance of ID numbers.35 
 Apart from demonstrating through protests, Bosnians have also exercised their 
voting rights to bring about significant changes in the 2010 elections. The Social-
Democratic Party (SDP), which declared itself as non-nationalistic and focused on socio-
economic issues rather than identity ones, received the majority of votes. The 2010 
elections showed that despite the Dayton-based constitution entrenched ethnic divisions, 
nationalist politics, corruption and patronage, some electoral change was possible. 
However, soon after the elections expectations of change via institutional means were 
disappointed. SDP politicians used the flawed political system to do what parties before 
them had done; striving to remain in power in order to enrich themselves and their 
affiliates.36 This, combined with a worsening economic situation in the country led to a 
climax of discontent, which exploded in protests in February 2014.  
 Led by laid-off factory workers, the protests began in Tuzla and were met with a 
brutal response from the police, provoking public outcry.37 The protests quickly spread to 
other major urban centres in BiH38 and some governmental buildings were set on fire, 
including the building of the Canton Sarajevo Government, but also buildings of canton 
governments in Zenica, Tuzla, and Mostar. Three days into the protests governments of 
Zenica-Doboj Canton, Tuzla Canton, and Sarajevo Canton resigned. They were followed 
by the resignation of the Una-Sana Canton Government a few days later. The protests 
quickly evolved into plenums, which were informal citizen councils established throughout 
the Federation of BiH. The citizens who took part in plenums came from all walks of life; 
workers, pensioners, grassroots activists, artists, students and the unemployed were all 
involved in plenums. There was no formal leadership, but the organization of plenum 
activities rested on people who demonstrated the best organising skills and who had ideas 
on how plenums should be shaped. Plenum sessions comprised two parts. In the first part, 
citizens had a chance to voice their concerns and requests - for such a long time ignored 
by the political elites and by international interveners. Everyone was given three minutes to 
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do so. In the second part, the most common requestswere adopted by plenums and sent 
to various levels and branches of government, demanding their immediate 
action. 39 Eventually, the requests of all plenums were merged and submitted to the 
Government of the Federation of BiH. From these requests it emerged that citizens were 
mainly concerned about issues linked to the appalling state of social justice in the country, 
including labour rights, 'thieving privatization', welfare and healthcare.40 
 These protests signal that citizens are breaking out of the vicious cycle imposed on 
them by a political system unresponsive to their demands and are demanding and 
beginning to implement a kind of peace in accordance with their history, culture and 
needs. By contrast, international NGOs, civil society actors often engineered by 
internationals, have failed to offer support to plenums or to even sympathise with their 
cause. 41 The protesters have even called to condemn internationally-funded NGOs 
because they are seen astied to the status quo and to the (nationalist) stance that “there is 
no alternative” to ethnic politics, nationalism, patronage and clientelism.42 
 Similarly the mainstream media, which after the war were heavily targeted by the 
international community, played a negative role during protests and plenums. There were 
very few media outlets providing accurate reports of the evolving situation. Much of the 
media served the political elites to spin the protests towards their agenda. In Republika 
Srpska, some media outlets published stories on the alleged, and unfounded, arming of 
protesters, with the aim of preparing an attack on Republika Srpska.43In the Federation the 
media reported President Izetbegović’s unverified claim that 12 kilograms of drugs had 
been found among the protesters, only to clarify later that the drugs were actually seized 
by the police in an unrelated operation. 
 Additionally, some political parties tried to hijack plenums and protests in order to 
present themselves as the new emerging subject, who could replace the old, corrupt one. 
Members of political parties infiltrated plenums either to make sure that they could be seen 
as leaders of changes or to undermine the plenums. The pressure from political parties 
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was also manifested in the fact that some participants of plenums were coerced into 
abandoning them.44Party members threatened participants with loss of their jobs, with 
sending inspections to close their businesses, or with subpoenaing them for hearings to 
police stations. The attempt to undermine plenums, along with the media harangue, 
showed how big the stakes for political eliteswere, and how much they felt threatened by 
the citizens’ actions. As a whole, the pressure that political parties exercised succeeded in 
decreasing the number of citizens attending plenum sessions, which gradually faded 
away. 
 Overall, the achievements that came with this round of protests, and with plenums, 
showed the growing re-politicisation of the public sphere and influence of citizens. Apart 
from the immediate results evident in governments' resignations, the protests provided a 
clear warning for political elites. They showed that public opinion matters much more than 
it did before 2008, when protests in BiH had (re)surfaced in the public realm. Protests 
demonstrated that citizens are becoming more organized in terms of articulating their 
requests and resistance to the limitations of the liberalized political system. The 
establishment of plenums which provided a venue that citizens could use to voice their 
concerns and a medium through which they could take their concerns to appropriate 
institutions. Additionally protests, along with plenums, reiterated the importance of non-
ethnic concerns among the population of the country, which is the main reason why they 
were met with approval throughout the country.45More broadly, the heterogeneous group 
of the protesters and their supporters demanded nothing less than a new way of doing 
politics based on a shared concern and responsibility for the ‘commons’ andattention to 
socio-economic issues.46As a whole, perhaps the greatest achievement of the February 
2014 protests is the newly found sense that “change” might be difficult, painful, and slow to 
come, but is possible.   
 
4. Local Agency and International Intervention 
High Representative of the International Community Valentin Inzko expressed well the 
discomfort common among international officials about the February 2014 protests when 
he suggested that, should the situation escalate, it might be necessary to send EU-troops 
                                                        
44
Confidential interview with members of the Sarajevo Plenum, 20 August, 2014.  
45
Klix.ba, 'Većina građana podržava proteste, a nasilje predstavlja preveliku cijenu promjena', 12 February, 
2014, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/vecina-gradjana-podrzava-proteste-a-nasilje-predstavlja-preveliku-cijenu-
promjena/140212119 Accessed on 22 August, 2014. 
46
DamirArsenjivić, ed., Unbribable Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Fight for the Commons, Baden-Baden, 
Nomos, 2014.  
 14 
to pacify trouble areas.47This initial reaction was soon qualified in favour of an expression 
towards the citizens’ right to protest peacefully, but nonetheless the reference to armed 
intervention revealed a profound confusion about the nature of the protest and how to 
address citizens’ demands. More than anything else, this type of statement highlighted two 
long-lasting, and problematic, priorities among international officials in their dealings with 
Bosnia.  
 First, the international community has placedethnic securityat the top of its post-
Dayton priorities – thus marginalizing other concerns and values, including justice, 
economic and social rights and, above all, the promotion of non-nationalist politics. No 
doubt, this prioritization has been largely due to the horrors of the war in the 1990s, and 
the related concern to avoid a relapse into conflict. At the same time, however, western 
anxieties about violence reflect a deeply ingrained orientalist or, to cite Maria Todorova, 
balkanist orientation towards the region.48 This orientation plays into the hands of ethno-
nationalist leaders who have been simultaneously working to preserve ethnic divisions 
while presenting themselves as the solution to the problems they contribute to create.In 
suggesting the possibility that the EU could intervene to re-establish order and security, 
Inzko inevitably sided with the supporters of the status quo, that is, the very same 
nationalist elitesBosnian citizens have been protesting against.  
 Second, and consequently, by accepting and accommodating distinct ethnic 
identities,the international community has primarily focused on stability instead of 
change.49Although international officials have frequently called upon Bosnian citizens to 
“make change happen” by rejecting nationalist programs and worldviews at the polls (and, 
by extension, in every political, economic and social sphere) they have nonetheless been 
the staunchest guarantors of the nationalist ethnic (dis)order that emerged at Dayton. Not 
only have they stood behind the unresponsive, fragmented, and ethnically based 
constitutional framework drafted by international lawyers, but also they have contributed to 
the consolidation of nationalist power by turning a blind eye to the misuse of international 
aid and resources.50As a result of this simultaneous, paradoxical role of both critics of 
ethno-nationalism and supporters of those structures and practices feeding ethno-
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nationalist politics, international officials have failed to listenand relate to Bosnian citizens. 
They have blamed citizens for not abandoning their nationalist leadersaltogether – thus 
not recognisingthat support for ethno-nationalist parties has been a rational response to a 
condition of fragmentation and fear.51Perhaps most importantly, when Bosnians have 
expressed clear non-nationalist views and demands, as with the February 2014 protests 
and in a variety of other instances described above, they have either ignored those 
demands or interpreted them as a threat to stability, rather than an opportunity for 
progressive change.  
 This inability to recognize and support non-nationalist views has characterised the 
international community’s approach to Bosnia. Most international observers, journalists 
and, above all, civil servants and diplomats have focused their analysis of and approach to 
intervention relying on ethnic and national categories.52For example, in commenting the 
February 2014 revolts, Inzko pointed out how “Muslims” were primarily involved. By so 
doing, Inzko involuntarily validated Bosnian leaders’ self-serving claim that the protests 
should have been understood as an ethnic problem caused by “hooligans” on the orders of 
other ethnic groups, and not as a social and economic one motivated by corruption and 
misrule. Faced with mounting criticism about his inability to interpret and act upon the 
situation, Inzko rectified his views claiming that “protests are not about who is a Bosniak, 
Croat, a Serb or an Other… [they are] about jobs and a normal, dignified life for 
all.”53While this correction belatedly stated the obvious, it did little to restore legitimacy for 
international officials, who are widely perceived as being either complicit with ethno-
nationalists, or aloof and unable to address citizens’ needs and demands. 
 More broadly, the February 2014 protests revealed the bankruptcy of the 
international strategy based on aneconomic and political liberalization formula. Neo-liberal 
restructuring is frequently criticized forprivileging the few through privatization and austerity 
programs, and for failing to sustain economic recovery – in Bosnia as elsewhere. Less 
noticed upon is the important rolemicro-finance has assumed within neo-liberal economic 
programs. International interveners consider micro-finance as one of the most promising 
tool to unleash individual entrepreneurship while, in a neo-liberal fashion, making 
redundant state responses to poverty alleviation. Despite high expectation, however, IMF 
                                                        
51
 John W. Hulsey, “‘WhyDidThey Vote for ThoseGuysAgain?’ Challenges and Contradictions in the 
Promotion of PoliticalModeration in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Democratization, 17 (6), 2010, pp. 
1132-1152.  
52
 David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia, Minneapolis: 
Universityof Minnesota Press, 1998.  
53
Oslobođenje: Interview with HR Valentin Inzko, 16February 2014, availableat: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-
dept/presso/pressi/default.asp?content_id=48419 
 16 
and World Bank micro-credit schemes have had a destructive economic and social impact 
on Bosnia – contributing to plunge a growing number of people into poverty, and to create 
the conditions for the sudden outbreak of citizens’ dissatisfaction – as in February 2014. 
 The microfinance sector appeared to have an initial degree of success by mid-
2000s, when nearly 400,000 microloans were granted. However, loans mostly 
underpinned consumption spending, led to growing individual over-indebtedness, and 
eventually ensued in the closing of microfinance institutions54 and the collapse of the 
micro-finance sector. As a result, “many ordinary Bosnian people… feel that they have 
effectively been abused by the microfinance industry, not assisted to better their 
lives.”55The impact on women has been especially damaging. In a country where a woman 
heads one in four households, microfinance was expected to contribute not only to 
economic recovery and development but also to gender emancipation. Instead, women’s 
engagement with microcredit contributed to their growing indebtedness, increasing default, 
and exposure to the humiliating court process required to sign off on their loans. 
 The neo-liberal reformist zeal in the political-institutional arena similarly ended with 
a failure to achieve significant changes and improvements.For several years after the end 
of the war international officials engagedin assertive intervention imposing legislation, 
removing obstructionist elected Bosnian officials and building a bureaucratic state 
apparatus. While this bold, forceful style achieved undeniable short-term positive results, it 
had a limited effect on both underlying power structures and citizens’ daily struggle to 
make ends meet. Bosnians seemed to have barely noticed international efforts. 
Significantly, the early 2014 protests and plenums did not even address any of their 
demands to international institutions. While the protesters’ choice to focus their attention 
on local authorities undoubtedly reflected a negative assessment of the work of 
international organizations in BiH, it also confirmed an engrained attitude deriving from 
Bosnians’ long co-existence with foreign rule.During about 4 centuries (1463-1878) they 
had lived as the westernmost province of the Ottomans Empire and later, for four decades 
(1878-1918), as a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  In large measure, while formally 
ruled by others, Bosnians of all faiths have generally been self-governing in day-to-day 
affairs. According to historian Emily Greble, while not displaying particular forms of 
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insolence or disrespect, “Sarajevans’ customary response to foreign rulers [was] ignoring 
them.”56 
 Given this type of response it isunsurprising that the international imposition of a 
variety of measures on Bosnia has left most citizens fairlyindifferent. The internationally 
perceivedneed to reach out to wider sectors of the population in order to favour domestic 
legitimacy of internationally sponsored institutions has led to a change of strategy. Since at 
least 2003, when the European Union solemnly and emphatically promised that the future 
of the region, including that of Bosnia, lies in the progressive integration into European 
institutions, international officials laboured to support domestic change without imposing it. 
Despite its persisting orientalist underpinnings reflected in the need of continuing external 
assistance and guidance embedded in the process,57Europeanization was expected to 
lead to the (more or less) voluntary adoption of liberal-democratic reforms by local elites 
without blatant top-down impositions by international officials. 
 But even such a strategy has failed to deliver change. The lure of getting closer to 
Europe has not convinced Bosnian elites of the need to abandon the most 
debatableethnic-guarantees, frequently turned into privileges for personal gain, and to 
reform their Byzantine, rights-violating constitution. In February 2014, as protests were 
breaking out in several Bosnian towns, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Stefan 
Füle held unproductive meetings with party leaders in Sarajevo, but ignored the citizen 
plenums, only to announce a few days later that negotiations to amend the constitution in 
line with the European Court of Human Rights ’Sejdic-Finci ruling failed.58 This fiasco was 
only the last one in a series of international attempts to mediate among the parties and 
achieve the modification of the Bosnian Constitution to comply with EU standards and 
legislation. As a whole, neo-liberal institution building has not led to the creation of 
anaccountable state responsive to citizens’ needs. Perhaps more damaging for Bosnian 
citizens, institution building has played into the hands of predatory Bosnian elites who 
have been able to highjack the reform process to preserve their control over their 
respective constituencies, and to take economic advantage from opportunities arising from 
the never-ending transition from war toa market democracy. As a participant in the 2014 
events put it, expressing the views of many protesters, “the so-called post-socialist 
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transition to liberal democracy has been experienced as a never-ending story of looting”59 
within whichordinary citizens are stuck between a traumatic violent pastand a future which 
still has to start – as expressed by the staging of “Waiting for Godot” mentioned above.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted that, with the arrival of the (neo-)liberal peace, the end of 
history has by no means been achieved.60 Politics thrives in post-intervention Bosnia, and 
the international community continues to play a crucial if not always positive role. What is 
encouraging, however, is the fact that the 2014 protests have given voice to a previously-
hidden political agenda, which springs from the concrete needs of the population rather 
than from an ethno-nationalist discourse. The protests may have become less visible over 
time, but they persist and are striving for structures of accountability which the international 
community had been unable to create in their twenty years of engagement. It was citizens’ 
initiatives that challenged the kind of peace born out of the Dayton Agreement, which in 
turn raises questions about the legitimacy of intervention, as well as the real meaning of 
local ownership, beyond the top-down control mechanisms of seemingly bottom-up 
initiatives. Hence, the protests have cast light on a marginalised type of agency which has 
claimed back the ownership of peace on its own terms. It remains to be seen where this 
will lead as well as the contestations involved in this process, but an important avenue has 
opened which might eventually challenge the participatory potential of Western 
democracies themselves.61What is clear is that, successfully or not, such dynamics of 
peace formation challengethe peace infrastructure created in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
beyond, whilst pointing to the ever-present but often-overlooked potential of non-
professionals to equip peace with meaningful content. 
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